

Cohort and Period Fertility in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future



Sergei V. Zakharov
Institute of Demography (IDEM)
State University – Higher School
of Economics (HSE)
Moscow, Russia



szakharov@hse.ru



*Period and cohort fertility
dynamics in the developed world*





The first HFD Symposium
MPIDR, 3-4 November 2011
Rostock, Germany

Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility During the Demographic Transition in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1980, period 1897-2010




Source: Zakharov S.V. (2008). Russian Federation: From the first to second demographic transition. *Demographic Research*. Vol. 19, p.910 (<http://www.demographic-research.org/Volumes/Vol19/24/>). (Updated for 2010 data)


Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2010, per 1000



Contribution of Age Groups to PFR, Russia: 1979-2010



Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2010



The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios:

**Optimism of Policy Makers,
Pessimism of Theorists
and
Common Sense of People**

Policy makers and general public show unfounded optimism: the “fertility problem” seems easily manageable and therefore must be solved

- At ordinary level, it is believed that the money (benefits) solves everything
- The official ideology (including such an active player as the church) rely on the ideas of traditionalism and national patriotism
- According to them, the new population policy adopted in 2007, no doubt, gives positive results
- Professional skepticism is not taken into account

Russian Specialists believe that the Change in Future Fertility is not that Uncertain

- The plausible value is 1.5-1.7 for foreseeable future (up to 2030)
- Completed cohort fertility tends to stabilize at this level
- Special adjusted period fertility measures controlling for age and parity stand for that
- Public opinion surveys about desired and expected number of children support this as well
- Russian and international experience tell us that family policy focusing on fertility stimulation mostly has tempo rather than quantum effects

COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE


‘How would Policy Measures-2007 affect your childbearing-related behavior?’, a question of the RusGGS-2007

- Would have as many children as planned but sooner than planned – **10%**
- Would have, perhaps, more children than planned – **8%**
- Will certainly have more children than planned – **1%**
- Measures will have no effect: respondents will not change their plans regarding the number and timing of births – **81%**

VISIBLE EFFECTS OF NEW POLICY MEASURES?

Period Parity Progression Ratios: Russia, 1979-2010

(Proportion of women moving from parity n to parity $n+1$ during the calendar year)



COMMON SENSE OF PEOPLE

Intentions of having the next child, respondents aged 25-35, %

Parity	GGs-2004	GGs-2007	GGs-2011
0	91	85	87
1	71	74	72
2	29	32	32
3	22	30	20
All	64	66	67

Actual and Projected CTFR According to Different Scenarios, Russia, 1930-1985 Birth Cohorts

