Cohort and Period Fertility in Russia: Long View of the Past and Short View of the Future

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Period and cohort fertility dynamics in the developed world
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Completed Cohort and Period Total Fertility During the Demographic Transition in Russia (average number of births to a woman by age 50): birth cohorts 1841-1980, period 1897-2010

Period ASFR, Russia: 1979-2010, per 1000
Contribution of Age Groups to PTFR, Russia: 1979-2010
Different Indicators of Total Fertility: Cohort versus Synthetic Measures, Russia, 1979-2010
The Uncertainty of Forecast Scenarios:

Optimism of Policy Makers, Pessimism of Theorists and Common Sense of People
Policy makers and general public show unfounded optimism: the “fertility problem” seems easily manageable and therefore must be solved.

- At ordinary level, it is believed that the money (benefits) solves everything.
- The official ideology (including such an active player as the church) rely on the ideas of traditionalism and national patriotism.
- According to them, the new population policy adopted in 2007, no doubt, gives positive results.
- Professional skepticism is not taken into account.
Russian Specialists believe that the Change in Future Fertility is not that Uncertain

- The plausible value is 1.5-1.7 for foreseeable future (up to 2030)
- Completed cohort fertility tends to stabilize at this level
- Special adjusted period fertility measures controlling for age and parity stand for that
- Public opinion surveys about desired and expected number of children support this as well
- Russian and international experience tell us that family policy focusing on fertility stimulation mostly has tempo rather than quantum effects
‘How would Policy Measures-2007 affect your childbearing-related behavior?’, a question of the RusGGS-2007

- Would have as many children as planned but sooner then planned – 10%
- Would have, perhaps, more children than planned – 8%
- Will certainly have more children than planned – 1%
- Measures will have no effect: respondents will not change their plans regarding the number and timing of births – 81%
Period Parity Progression Ratios: Russia, 1979-2010
(Proportion of women moving from parity \( n \) to parity \( n+1 \) during the calendar year)
## Intentions of having the next child, respondents aged 25-35, %

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<tr>
<th>Parity</th>
<th>GGS-2004</th>
<th>GGS-2007</th>
<th>GGS-2011</th>
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<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>All</td>
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Actual and Projected CTFR According to Different Scenarios, Russia, 1930-1985 Birth Cohorts